However, the acquisition was not as productive as expected. Verifone lost its number one position in the world after four years and was failing to turn a profit. Under Hewlett-Packard, Verifone Managers were not empowered to make the changes they needed to make. H.P’s structure (The Green Sheet) was too bureaucratic and there was no flexibility and fiscal discipline.

This culture led to the exit of many of the then senior management. At Verifone Inc July 2001 Gores Technology Group acquired Verifone and got it back on track to becoming the leader in the industry and to be the only profitable company amongst its competitors. On June 18, 2002 Gores Technology Group entered into an agreement with GTCR Golder Rauner to recapitalized Verifone. In this agreement The Gores Technology Group retained an ownership interest in the company. GTCR is one of the oldest and most successful private equity firms in the country. Founded in 1980, they pioneered the strategy of identifying and partnering with outstanding executives to build leading companies. According to it’s website it has successfully invested in more than 150 companies in a wide variety of industries over the last 20 years.

According to Collin Roche, Principal (GTCR has 13 principals) at GTCR, Verifone should continue to grow as it further leverages its brand, customer service capabilities, and technology to serve the needs of merchants, transaction processors, and financial institutions. Roche has been quoted as saying “Doug Bergeron (CEO at Verifone) and his experienced management team have reinvigorated VeriFone, making the company more entrepreneurial by creating new partnership relationships with its customers and distributors. Many of these managers previously participated in bringing VeriFone from a start-up to a highly successful payment technology company. More recently, Doug and the management team re-established a strong level of profitability at the company and directed their resources to the continual upgrade of the company’s product line.”

What’s clear is that some companies are going to find it hard to keep up. The corporate graveyard will be strewn with the bodies of companies that don’t understand how to make the shift from the traditional organization to the virtual. Many of them will be the leaders of the old because leaders of the old often have the most difficulty embracing the new. VeriFone is an example a 21st century organization. It is a virtual corporation, its corporate environment provides for ultimate adaptability and flexibility. The key emphasis is on empowerment and self-control of the employees. In this new model of work, the employees are expected to make decisions and judgments based on the demands of the specific situations. Given greater responsibility of the employees, such organizations are focusing on developing the judgmental ability of such employees. VeriFone emphasizes a lot on sharing the corporate philosophy with their remote employees. This issue is related to the company’s broad vision and strategic goals, which are communicated through the shared culture and common corporate values.

VeriFone has no corporate headquarters and is at home everywhere in the world. It generates roughly one-third of its revenue and stations more than half its workforce outside the United States. This global reach creates enormous advantages over the rag-tag band of local companies against which it competes VeriFone chose corporate sites with its customers and emerging markets in mind. VeriFone calls these sites “centers of excellence”. VeriFone refers to its corporate structure as a decentralized network of locations. VeriFone has approximately 1,000 employees in 34 worldwide locations. (See figure 1 for VeriFone Worldwide Facilities) This geographic dispersion is what caused the need for VeriFone to become a “virtual organization”.

In this paper we described the evolution of Verifone’s corporate strategy from its founding in 1981 to the present. Verifone relied to a large extent on its leadership as a technological innovator. As the markets for Verifone’s products have become more mature and diverse, the company appears to be entering a new area that will likely be defined as much by marketing forces as by technology leadership. Because of this evolution, additional new competencies have become important, while some existing ones have become less important. Verifone must not only develop new competencies, but must also succeed at managing and integrating these different skill sets with their existing organization. After an analysis of the process used by Verifone to develop and implements its strategy it lead us to identify key techniques and approaches for managing in an increasingly pluralistic world.

From a strategic management point of view, Verifone’s challenges can be translated into four key aspects of the strategy-making process:
(i) Exploiting opportunities associated with the core business,
(ii) Exploiting new opportunities outside the core business,
(iii) Balancing the challenges in (i) and (ii) over time
(iv) Stimulating the generation of new opportunities.
VeriFone has 21 years of experience in the electronic payment industry and it appears to be ready for a new era, and a new generation of solutions that deliver benefits above and beyond card acceptance.

INTRODUCTION

Verifone is the leading supplier of automation payment systems used by retailers, healthcare providers and financial institutions in the United States, Europe, the Pacific Rim and other areas. The company designs, manufacturers and markets electronic solutions designed to automate the processing of payments, benefits and information transactions. Verifone initially provided simple electronic check verification systems and later expanded to provide retail credit card and check authorization, smart card technology, Internet payments solutions, client server payment processing solutions for financial institutions, and solutions to enable the home banking marketplace.

The company changed leadership often under three different management teams in short time period, existing Verifone management, HP acquisition, and Gores Technology group. Verifone went for a roller coaster ride which ranged from being a market leader in 1996 to loosing money under HP’s management and then back again to being the market leader. Additionally, Gore Technology Group turned Verifone into a profitable company once again only 100 days after the acquisition from HP. This paper would be looking in to the various aspects of the management in all these phases.

DISCUSSION

Organization Structure:

In 1997 Verifone had approximately 3000 employees in 1997, working in more than 30 facilities, including regional offices, development centers, manufacturing, and distribution centers located throughout North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Pacific. Verifone management chose its geographic sites to ensure close contact with customers and physical proximity to emerging markets and “centers of excellence” areas known for their intellectual or capital resources.
The CEO, Mr. Hatim Tyabji, described Verifone’s corporate model as a decentralized network of locations where all locations are created equal. Many corporate functions, such as Human Resources Management and Management Information Systems, were run decentrally out of multiple global locations, rather than out of Redwood City, California, the nominal corporate headquarters for the company. Verifone was often referred to as a virtual company because of its geographic dispersion and high reliance on technology to integrate operations within the company”. (Applegate Lynda M) However, most companies that claim to be global, establish offices in different countries, that act as sales offices rather than as corporate peers. In contrast, Verifone’s 34 facilities in nine countries have significant autonomy. “The anywhere/anytime culture works only because Verifone’s 34 locations in nine countries are hooked to the company’s Digital VAXmail systems over private leased lines. Employees also exchange mail and documents over the Internet. Nearly all of Verifone’s employees are equipped with a laptop. There are no executive secretaries. Paper memos are verboten.” (Stoddard, 1997). Verifone’s use of information technology was an important element in the transformation to a global or a virtual company.

The vision of the company which was, global growth through development of innovative transaction automation products and consistent operational excellence, drives an technology vision that includes an infrastructure that fosters shared objectives, shared ideas, and 24 hour problem solving; a reporting system that identifies areas of weakness and strength; and widespread access to real time information for employees at all levels.

There are three key principles to making the technology vision work: 1)Use a single, centralized database, and provide access to all data, from all locations at all times; 2) Provide universal electronic mail and selective videoconferencing capabilities for connectivity and collaboration; and 3) Don’t buy a Ferrari when a Ford Fairlane will do.

Each Verifone employee has a notebook computer and dials into the company’s network irrespective of his location, thus it can be said that Verifone is a virtual company and this is made possible only because of the use of technology which enables its employees to stay connected to other employees in all the locations throughout the world just as in one office.

Verifone Culture:
Verifone’s founder instilled the following cornerstone values into his company’s culture, commitment to excellence, dedication to customer needs, promotion of teamwork, recognition of the individual, a global mindset, and ethical conduct. Tyabji, who assumed leadership of the company in 1986, also took deliberate steps to stress these values, so that they would remain at the heart of the company’s internal and external activities. Since its founding, Verifone’s management recognized individualism as a source of creativity. In 1987 this tradition was formalized with the publication of the philosophy document, which explicitly stated, “The people who know best how the job should be done are the ones doing it. We involve employees directly in the management of their own areas of responsibility.” (Applegate, Lynda, McFarlan, & McKenny, 1999). The employees and the managers of Verifone further reiterated this philosophy.

Verifone’s cultural zeal to identify and meet customer needs was reflected and created in numerous ways. Executives were constantly asking two questions, “Where is the customer’s pain?” and can VeriFone make money by alleviating this pain?” Facilities were placed near emerging markets and even technical employees were urged to travel to become well acquainted with clients. The driving principles in product design at Verifone were low cost, high value, high reliability, and high volume. When combined with Verifone’s IT capability, this culture of customer responsiveness often had amazing outcomes.

Another notable feature of Verifone’s day-to-day functioning was the speed of action a d decision-making. Experimentation was encouraged at every level of the organization. In spite of its culture of urgency, Verifone management wanted the company to be perceived as a human company. Hence VeriLife, an umbrella for a number of human resources programs, had been implemented to help employees and their families deal with the demands that Verifone placed on their lives.” (Stoddard, 1997).

But from 1997, under the management of H.P, it was these basic tenets of culture that had to be compromised as the corporate culture of HP was juxtaposed with these cultural characteristics of Verifone. According to the Business Journal (2002), “The two companies’ corporate cultures also had trouble meshing. H.P.’s culture of management by consensus conflicted with Verifone’s belief in moving decisively and quickly. HP had burdensome business processes that it imposed on Verifone restricting its progress. But at the same time Verifone felt lost in and ignored by the huge HP.” Further,
under Hewlett-Packard, Verifone Managers were not empowered to make the changes they needed to make. (The Green Sheet, 2001) In H.P. there was structure and bureaucracy but there was no flexibility and fiscal discipline. This culture stifled the entire organization and the management, which led to the exit of most of the then senior management.

Since 2001, under the new management of Gores Technology Group Verifone is back on track with a rapid return to entrepreneurial management and organizational structures that competes more successfully. This was sufficiently proved from the very fact that within the first 100 days under the new management the company showed signs of profit.

“Revenues for the period exceeded $100 million. Earnings from operations, excluding interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) exceeded 10% for the period.”(Fahn, 2001).

Challenges:

1. Terminal makers are locked in price competition. Many merchants are content with relatively simple older machines and see little value in newer, high-tech models. Plus foreign terminal makers are moving into Verifone’s North American heartland as never before. Last summer (2001), France’s Ingenico S.A. bough IVI Checkmate Corp., the No. 1 terminal seller in the United States and Canada and is poised to challenge leaders Verifone and Hypercom. (Daly J.J, Back to the Future for Verifone)
2. Stiff Resistance: Any new product of Verifone’s will have to overcome the traditional reluctance of merchants, especially small one’s, to buy or lease new terminals if their current machines are adequately getting authorizations and capturing electronic sales drafts. (Daly J.J, Back to the Future for Verifone)
3. Internet trade: Verifone is banking on the fact that more than 90% of the trade is person to person with an electronic engine in the middle, where as its not prepared for the Internet payment application space which requires large complex application software unrelated to the Verifone’s point of sale technology. (The Green sheet)
4. Verifone has pioneered hardware and software systems to automate credit card transactions. It also offers integrated payment solutions to facilitate debit/credit and smart card payments at the merchant countertop and over the Internet, and is actively developing new consumer payment systems for the home. VeriFone has shipped more than five million electronic payment systems that are used in over 100 countries. (The Green Sheet) As the markets for Verifone’s products have become more mature and diverse, the company appears to be entering a new era that will likely be defined as much by marketing forces as by technology leadership. Verifone has scored victories with substantial shipment to businesses such as KFC, Ahold, Concord EFS, Global Payments Inc. and Pizza Hut. Because of the evolution in this business, additional new competencies have become important, while some existing ones have become less important. Verifone must not only develop new competencies, but must also succeed at managing and integrating these different skill sets with their existing organization. After an analysis of the process used by Verifone to develop and implements its strategy it lead us to identify key techniques and approaches for managing in an increasingly pluralistic world. From a strategic management point of view, Verifone’s challenges can be translated into four key aspects of the strategy-making process:
(v) Exploiting opportunities associated with the core business,
(vi) Exploiting new opportunities outside the core business,
(vii) Balancing the challenges in (i) and (ii) over time
(viii) Stimulating the generation of new opportunities.
VeriFone has 21 years of experience in the electronic payment industry and it appears to be ready for a new era, and a new generation of solutions that deliver benefits above and beyond card acceptance. Verifone is determined to reestablish its historic role as leader, innovator and largest provider of payment solutions worldwide. It is welcoming back its customers and new partners to a new era of sustained growth and development.

Future:
To be successful, what must the company do well?

Challenge assumptions: In order to accompanied with the development of the new techniques in the electronic payment systems VeriFone needs to investigate new demands from customers, they will modify customers’ needs and expectations, as well as the evolution of financial tools.

VeriFone always must be sensitive to the impact of their products, not just their success stories but their failures. Often in their failures may be a potential opportunity for which they may have perceived but moved in the wrong direction. Changes in the customers’ demands and their products will also push the company to develop new strategies, and to identify what are the critical factors for success in this industry.

There are many issues that VeriFone needs to be concern about: security, data errors, and transaction cost are main features for the future of electronic payment systems. For example, The Verifone Omni 3350 terminal provides a full set of the latest payment capabilities in a design that supports any need-now and in the future. Taking advantage of Verifone’s next-generation Verix operating system, the terminals let you securely run multiple applications, such as payment and loyalty, on one terminal. Fully integrated smart card processing supports the latest stored value card schemes. A blazing 32-bit processor, 14.4-Kbps modem and the industry’s fastest thermal printer speeds your customers through the line. And an intuitive ATM-style interface lets employees virtually train themselves, while reducing errors. (Verifone Omni 3350)

Well Involving to the industrial market: In order to compete with the trusted worldwide leader in electronic payment solution market, VeriFone needs to have excellent strategies to get closer marketing resources. They will put efforts on financial processors to get above strategies from field-level product training and sales support. This will be corresponded to the fast growing of the electronic commercial services as a part of core markets and core values.

Customers of VeriFone always desire a convenient service for electronic transactions. To get products that provide superior services in electronic business transactions, VeriFone needs to learn to be effective managers during both chaos condition and successful condition. This is the most likely key to succeed. It also helps in the decision making process.

Partners: VeriFone’s needs to commit to educating and supporting the field-level players in the payment industry. It is consider as part of response to the increasing demand for its newer more powerful solutions. They provide tremendous resources in terms of technology expertise, financial backup, relationships, management capabilities, and brand recognition. Thus, participation in one of these partnerships can determine which system dominates over the others.

Open new markets: There are no physical borders for electronic commerce, and today international shopping is a fact. As a result, electronic payment systems must enable international payments without adding significant costs or difficulties. VeriFone is thrilled to partner many different companies. This investment is an affirmation of VeriFone’s strategy and competitive position. These partners are a great long-term partner for VeriFone, its employees, customers and international distributors.”

Conclusion:

VeriFone’s has become the terminal of choice for the U.S. payment industry today. Everyday, VeriFone’s new products have been designed with more effective features, but also at a lower cost. These products are not attributable to any single person of VeriFone, but they are a product of the “whole company”, which involves all employees from general managers to the lowest level employees of the company.

As the recognized leader in e-payments world-wide, VeriFone’s solutions draw upon our unmatched technology, reliability, security, and extensive commercial application expertise to offer solutions that can easily integrate with PCs and databases. As Verifone’s continues to build upon their core competencies, they also need to keep the entrepreneurial spirit that propelled the company to an industry leader. As technologies such as wireless and broadband penetrate commercial and retail markets, Verifone must be able to adapt their business model to take advantage of these opportunities

Competitive and regulatory pressures make it mandatory to have a sound company-wide risk management framework in place. Companies that do not implement such a risk management framework may be unable to compete effectively in today’s marketplace.

        

A global marketplace characterized by the commoditization of customer driven business, industry consolidation, deregulation, service line expansion and technology advances has heightened the level and nature of potential risks. The current environment demands sophisticated and comprehensive controls to quickly bring products to market, reduce operating costs, and most important, maintain risk within acceptable balances. The expectations of Boards of Directors, regulatory bodies, rating agencies, and shareholders regarding controls continue to rise. Moreover, it goes beyond just “risk controls”; market leaders have evolved “risk management” to the point where they view it as a core competency.

As a core competency, risk management empowers organizations to not only control risk, but also measure performance more effectively, determine capital allocations and realize a variety of other business advantages. Thus, by being more proactive, an organization can gain a competitive edge and even enhance its business reputation.

Evolution of Risk Management Practices
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as financial markets and products became increasingly sophisticated and complex, risk management developed into a highly specialized area of expertise. Over the past decade, many institutions have invested heavily in the development of systems to better measure and manage specific risks. However, in recent years, there have been developing trends in the market environment creating the need for institutions to manage risk more comprehensively because of the evolution of existing products and emergence of Islamic products.

While institutions continue to strengthen risk management practices in specific areas, a less than comprehensive approach has led to significant losses at certain institutions.

Risk Dimensions
Risk dimensions include such risks as market, credit, settlement, operational, liquidity, and legal/compliance and will vary in importance based on the business activities of an organization.

Risk Management Life Cycle
The risk management life cycle includes the four phases of identification, measurement, management, and monitoring.

Organizational Responsibilities
Risk management needs to be performed on a company-wide basis involving the Board of Directors, credit, senior management, independent risk management, business line management, finance and control, legal/compliance, treasury and operations, with significant support from internal audit and information technology, incase of Islamic banks Shariah Advisory Board.

Business Processes
Risks are rooted in every step of an organization’s business processing flow from the establishment of business strategy and policies and procedures through the evaluation and control of individual transactions.

These fundamental risk management perspectives should be used as the basis of any review and assessment of an organization’s risk management policies and practices.

Evolution
The banking industry in developed markets is undergoing a steady and profound transformation. The areas in which banks have historically generated most of their profits are being squeezed, eliminated by technology and appropriated by new players. To compensate, banks are pursuing growth in sectors, which previously fell for example Islamic Banking.

Islamic Banking
Since the early 1960s, Muslim economists have been propagating the idea of profit-loss sharing (PLS) in the banking business. The main philosophy is distributive justice. More attention is given to the asset side of the balance sheet, namely financing, while deposit mobilization receives relatively less attention.

Riba or interest, which is banned by the Quran, is considered unproductive since it is created without risk. Sometimes, Muslim economists tend to use the Marxian argument that interest and capital have no value since value is only created by labor. As such, any gain where labor is absent is illegitimate. Thus, capital without labor is impotent. Capital becomes productive only when labor is added to it. In other words, there is no production process without labor.

In the Islamic banking system today, the creation of profit in the Murabaha and Musharaka financing is considered legitimate because in trading and commerce, (Al-bay’) capital is combined with labor. Riba profit is not a legitimate form of income because it is created from “capital divorced of labor”. That is, the bank is not taking an active and meaningful role in converting capital input into final output.

But as an intermediary, a bank may find it too demanding to be directly involved in production, such as manufacturing or farming. The risks in production are too overwhelming. Banks have refused to combine their loan capital with labor out of fear that the business entity in which both capital and labor are combined will close down due to market risks.

Islamic Financial Institutions: Nature and Risks
Distinguish two models of Islamic banks based on the structure of the assets. The first is the two –tier Mudarabah model that replaces interest by profit-sharing (PS) modes on both liability and asset sides of the bank. In particular, in this model all assets are financed by PS modes of financing (Mudarabah). This model of Islamic banking will also take up the role of an investment intermediary, rather than being a commercial bank only.

The second model of Islamic banking is the one-tier Mudarabah with multiple investment tools. This model evolved because Islamic banks faced practical and operational problems in using profit-sharing modes of financing on the asset side. As mentioned earlier, fixed-income instruments include Murabaha (cost-plus or mark –up sale), installment sale (medium/ long-term Murabaha), Istisna / Salam (object deferred sale or pre-paid sale) and Ijarah.

Islamic banking offers financial services by complying with the religious prohibition of Riba. Riba is a return (interest) charged in a loan (Qard hasana) contract. This religious injunction has sharpened the differences between current accounts (interest for loans taken by owners of the Islamic bank) and investment deposits (Mudarabah funds). In the former case, the repayment on demand of the principal amount is guaranteed without any return. The owners of current accounts do not share with the bank in its risks. In case of investment deposits, neither the principal nor a return is guaranteed. Investment accounts can be further classified as restricted and unrestricted, the former having restrictions on assets that the funds can be used for and on withdrawals before maturity date. The owners of investment accounts participate in the risks and share in the bank’s profits on pro-rata basis. The contracts of Qard hasana and Mudarabah are thus the fundamental pillars of Islamic banking and their characteristics must fully be protected for the preservation of the uniqueness of Islamic banks.

The Islamic bank described above appears to have characteristics of both an investment intermediary and a commercial bank. The ownership pattern of the Islamic bank resembles that of a commercial bank as the depositors do not own the bank and do not have voting rights. In Islamic finance parlance, this means while Musharaka contract characterizes the equity; owner deposits take the form of Mudarabah contracts. An Islamic bank, however, has similarities with an investment intermediary as it shares the profit generated from its operations with those who hold investment accounts. After paying the depositors a share of the profit, the residual net-income is given out to the shareholders as dividends.

Using profit- sharing modes in Islamic banks changes the nature of risks these institutions face. The returns on saving/ investment deposit are state contingent. As the depositors are rewarded on a profit-loss sharing (PLS) method, they share the business risks of the banking operations of the bank. The profit/ loss-sharing feature of these depositors introduces some other risks. Furthermore, the use of Islamic modes of financing on the asset sides changes the nature of traditional risks. We outline the nature of risks that Islamic banks face and risks inherent in different modes of financing below.

Nature of Risks Faced by Islamic Banks
Credit Risk
Credit risk would take the form of settlement/ payment risks arising when one party to a deal pays money (e.g. in a Slam or Istisna contract) or delivers assets (e.g., in a Murabaha contract) before receiving its own assets or cash, thereby, exposing it to potential loss. In case of profit-sharing modes of financing (like Mudarabah and Musharaka) the credit risk will be non-payment of the share of the bank by the entrepreneur when it is due. This problem may arise for banks in these cases due to the asymmetric information problem in which they do not have sufficient information on the actual profit of the firm. As Murabaha contracts are trading contracts, credit risk arises in the form of counterparty risk due to nonperformance of a trading partner. The nonperformance can be due to external systematic sources.

Benchmark Risk
As Islamic banks do not deal with interest rate, it may appear that they do not have market risks arising from changes in the interest rate. Changes in the market interest rate, however, introduce some risks in the earnings of Islamic financial institutions. Financial institutions use a benchmark rate, to price different financial instruments. Specifically, in a Murabaha contract the mark-up is determined by adding the risk premium to the benchmark rate (usually the LIBOR). The nature of fixed income assets is such that the mark-up is fixed for the duration of the contract. As such if the benchmark rate changes, the mark-up rates on these fixed income contracts cannot be adjusted. As a result Islamic banks face risks arising from movements in market interest rate.

Liquidity Risk
As mentioned above, liquidity risk arises from either difficulties in obtaining cash at reasonable cost from borrowings or sale of assets. The liquidity risk arising from both sources is critical for Islamic banks. As interest based loans are prohibited by Shari’ah, Islamic banks cannot borrow funds to meet liquidity requirement in case of need. Furthermore, Shari’ah does not allow the sale of debt, other than its face value; thus, to raise funds by selling debt-based assets is not an option for Islamic financial institutions.

The general understanding is that it is due to prohibition on participation in the so-called money market, which primarily deals in fixed income securities. Islamic banks, globally, hold Islamic Bonds or Sukuk, but there is no secondary market trading in these issues. Therefore such securities are only held to maturity and therefore cannot be converted into cash. In Pakistan it is even worse because of absence/lack of such instruments. But Islamic banks with the help of State Bank of Pakistan are in the phase of developing such instruments.

Operational Risk
Given the newness of Islamic banks, operational risk in terms of person risk can be acute in these institutions. Operational risk in this respect particularly arises as the banks may not have enough qualified professionals (capacity and capability) to conduct the Islamic financial operations. Given the different nature of business the computer software available in the market for conventional banks may not be appropriate for Islamic banks. This gives rise to system risks of developing and using informational technologies in Islamic banks.

Legal Risk
Given the different nature of financial contracts, Islamic banks face risks related to their documentation and enforcement. As there are no standard forms of contracts for various financial instruments, Islamic banks prepare these according to their understanding of the Shari’ah, the local laws, and their needs and concerns. Lack of standardized contracts along with the fact that there are no litigation systems to resolve problems associated with enforceability of contracts by the counterparty increases the legal risks associated with the Islamic contractual agreements.

Leadership is a prerequisite for effective management without leadership skills one cannot be an effective manager Tappen (1985). For the purpose of this assignment the types and characteristics of leadership will be discussed. The author will briefly review the theories of leadership. Particular emphasis will be placed on the difference between transactional and transformational leadership and how it is relevant in modern nursing. The author will also explore why nursing leadership and management is vital in todays healthcare environment and how changes in healthcare have influenced leadership and management in modern nursing.

        

Tappen (2001) identifies the difference between management and leadership as follows: There is a close relationship between the concepts of leadership and management. Management is a formal specifically designated position within an organization. Each department and clinical area has a manager who is responsible for the organization of that specific area. Tappen (2001) states leadership is an unofficially achieved position that may be assumed by more than one person at any one time. Tappen suggests that management is an assigned role, leadership is an attained one. The literature also acknowledges the concept that all people have untapped leadership potential (Tichy1997).

It is also acknowledged in the literature reviewed and it highlights that that there is confusion regarding the difference between leadership and management (Carney 1999). It is suggested that they are one and the same thing but the management role is task orientated, while the leadership role is team orientated.
None the less both concepts are pivotal in the delivery of health care. Watson (cited by Beech 2002) identifies a useful distinction between management and leadership, using the 7Sframework: managers rely on strategy, structures and systems . Leaders use an approach involving style , staff, skill and shared goals.

To be effective leaders and managers in the nursing profession, nurse professionals must have adequate nursing knowledge, self awareness, the ability to communicate clearly and effectively and the ability to mobilize, empower and be enthusiastic about leadership activities (Tappen 1995). Burns (cited by Marquis and Huston 2000) state that there are two styles of management leaders, relevant to nursing; transactional and transformational leaders. Other styles noted in the literature include autocratic, bureaucratic, democratic, laissez faire, and employee controlled (McAdoo 2003).Theories of leadership include the trait approach, the behavioural approach, contingency leadership and charismatic leaders. The author will now focus on transformational and transactional leadership.

Transformational Leadership
Transformational leadership identified by Tappen (2000) is the ability to motivate others to achieve high standards and long term goals. Transformational leaders have characteristics of being change agents, courteous, believing in people and having the ability to deal with complexity, uncertainty and being life long learners. They have a strong belief in themselves , being aware of personal strengths and weakness and have a strong belief in the success of the organization. They create an empowering culture. Carney (1999) states the empowered nurse will deliver many benefits to an organization. Nurse empowerment will ensure that healthcare is planned and delivered in an effective manner. Communication skills, strong values and beliefs and mutual respect are evident in the transformational leader. Transformational leadership is a key factor in optimising team performance in the delivery of quality patient care. The transformational leader provides direction for the team while enabling other team members to act. The need for effective team leadership is documented in the literature. Ovretveit (cited by Beech 2002) argues that team problems are caused by inadequate team leadership rather than any other factors. Transformational leaders are proactive and create visionary organizations. They use skills of problem solving and focus on results. An environment for success and quality is encouraged and the development of key personnel is also encouraged rather than control personnel, respect for staff is also a focus of transformational leaders. They understand that elitist attitudes are unethical and so stunt development of both organizations and personnel (Miller 1996).

Transactional Leadership
The transactional leader does not possess the previously names qualities. The characteristics of a transactional leader include the following principles; the transactional leader is more like the traditional manager, responsible for the day to day management of tasks. They focus on achieving the task at hand and maintaining the status quo. They are in a caretaker role and have no vision for the future and shared values are not identified . The transactional leader expects staff to carry out work in exchange for payment. The transactional manager can positively or negatively influenence organisational structure.

Transactional leadership best describes nursing leadership in the past (Carney1999). In the history of Irish nursing transactional nursing has been predominant (McCarthy 1998). This type of leadership was effective but it impeded the development of nurses in their management role. Lack of nursing leadership at the development of health policy has resulted in inadequate consultation with regard to nursing The health care environment is both complex and dynamic involving a variety of team members from a multidisciplinary background. Leaders are required to ensure that health care is delivered by nurses with effectiveness and efficiency. The quality of the health care delivered in the Irish health care setting is primarily determined by the quality of the nursing services. By having effective and efficient nursing workforce, it will lead to a better quality of health service.

Leaders are key to the delivery of quality care in an organization and need to be valued in their role. Kelley and Joel (1995) note that there are stumbling blocks to the development of the leadership role. This is due to the divisiveness within the profession. Other inhibitors include the lack of cohesiveness within nursing, lack of agreement on professional goals, lack of planned leadership development, and lack of internal support systems. Other issues for nurse leaders include the flattening of organization structures, the stressful nature of the work the nature of nursing practice, shift work and working conditions ( McAdoo 2003).

Healthcare organizations are undergoing enormous changes. Health policies for example The Health Strategy. Quality and Fairness (2001) and the Commission on Health Funding (1989), The Management Development Strategy (1996) have a major influence on the delivery of health care. Nurse managers and leaders are being affected by these changes. One of the goals of the Health Strategy is high performance. The Management Development Strategy (1996) established the Office of Health Management. It influences the recruitment and selection of nursing personnel and the decentralization of decision making. It promotes individual performance appraisal and leadership and management development. The implications of these have major influence on nursing management resources and the leadership skills required.

In Ireland the national budget for healthcare has risen dramatically since 1997 from 15.3% to 21.4% GDP (Foley and Murtagh 2003). As there is increasing pressure on resources and the need for prioritisation and accountability, the involvement of competent nurse managers is required. 28,000 Nurses are employed in the Irish health service; the largest group of healthcare professionals. McCarthy (1998) purposes that ” leadership in Irish nursing requires an transformational approach.” Professional managers are needed who are knowledgeable, skilful and competent and critical thinkers, to ensure that the changes implemented have a positive impact on the quality of patient care.

Nurse leaders are required to be represented at planning and policy development and strategy planning at national level. This is important when competing in an environment where resources are reduced. As the largest group of healthcare professionals, nurses need to influence the development of health policy. The Commission on Nursing (1998) addresses the changing role of the nurse and introduced significant changes in the management and leadership structures in the healthcare setting. One of the many terms of reference for the Commission was the evolving role of nurses in overall management of nursing services and in the area of professional development.
Recommendations and implementations of the Commission was the development of the Chief Nursing Officer in the Department of Health and Children with support from recruitment of nurses and midwives from the health sector (Department of Health 1998). The development of Nurse Planning Development Units and the development of management and leadership education programmes promotes the development of future leaders and managers in the nursing profession. The establishment of the National Council for Professional Development, as recommended by the Commission On Nursing also focuses on professional and clinical leadership, staff development, resource management and facilitating communication. (Department of Health 1998).

McCarthy (1998) stresses that leadership is one of the most important competencies of nursing management and requires strengthening and development. Resulting from the Commission on Nursing , nurse managers are involved at three levels , executive , middle and first line managers , with specific competencies required for each level. These competencies are outlined by the Office of Health Management (2000)and are as follows: The executive management level provides strategic and clinical leadership, establishes policies systems and structures ; leads on vision, values and process and focuses on the corporate agenda .The middle management role must have a defined management role. The competencies required include an empowering and enabling leadership style, setting and monitoring of performance standards , negotiation skills , a proactive approach to planning, and effective coordination of resources. The first line management competencies include planning and organization , building and leading teams , and leading on clinical practice and service quality. (Office of Health Management 2000)

Autonomy and accountability for decision-making are principle factors in the delivery of healthcare in the current healthcare environment (Carney 1999). In relation to autonomy, as the largest group of healthcare professionals, nurses require a strong voice in terms of influencing health policy and general management issues. Autonomy is also evident in the role of clinical nurse specialist and advanced nurse practitioners and in primary nursing.

A principle theme of the Health Strategy (1994) and (2001) is accountability. Health care professionals will need to work effectively and efficiently in a more accountable culture. This will require nurse leaders and managers to develop new skills and working practices through clinical and shared governance, networking and mentoring. The devolution of decision-making is required so that junior colleagues can solve problems locally and feel confident in their working practices (Department of Health and Children 1996). They need to be reflective practitioners who have skills of critical thinking. Future nurse leaders and managers need to have adequate nursing knowledge, self-awareness, and the ability to communicate effectively. They also require the ability to empower other healthcare personnel. The competence and creativity of managers and leaders at all levels in health care will be fundamental to the effective implementation of the health strategy (Department of Health and Children. 1996).

Shared governance is a system that shares power, control and decision making with the professional nursing staff with a clinical decision making framework. The flattening of organizational structures within the health service means that there is a need to increase job satisfaction by empowering staff without necessarily changing roles. The aim of participating in shared governance is to enhance work performance, job satisfaction, patient satisfaction and improve staff turnover rates within an organization (Halligan 2000).The key principle is the decentralization of power which results in the empowerment of staff in the practice area. Accountability is another key element of shared governance.

Networking as defined by Kelley and Joel (1995) gives visibility to nurses. It provides advice, information and guidance and provides contact with other nursing personnel. It can break down communication barriers within organizations. Mentoring as defined by the Office of health Management (2000) is career management tool used by organizations to nurture and develop staff. Staff mentors provide a useful role in introducing the nurse to the management role. The literature propose that transformational leadership will allow this process of innovation and change (Carney1999)

Considering nurse shortages and the financial difficulties of the health service presently, transformational leadership could be effective in retention and recruitment of nursing personnel. Organizations cannot afford to support non productive employees. No longer will the concept of accidental managers be possible. A transformational leader will develop nursing personnel to achieve their full potential and create a quality health care environment. The literature stress that clinical nurse managers and leaders have a vital role to play in creating the conditions conducive to staff retention (Department of Health 2002).

Leaders influence others by what they say, how they say it and what they do (Miller 1996). The author’s employing authority is proactive in providing a leadership and management programme for all nursing personnel. The L.E.O. Programme (Leading an Empowered Organization) is offered to all nursing personnel. The aim for the nursing personnel is to enable them to create a strong leadership environment and the development of management skills to deal with the changes evident in the current health care environment.

In conclusion, the literature addresses the concept that in the Irish healthcare context nursing is over managed and under led (McCarthy 1998) resulting from the traditional type of education, but leadership is developing through education, shared governance, mentoring and networking. Transformational leaders need to be autonomous, knowledgeable skilful, competent and accountable in their nursing practice. Future nurse leaders and managers need to be able to empower enable and create a vision because of the dynamic changing healthcare environment. Nurses need to be able to achieve order out of chaos (Carney 1999).Accountability and autonomy are major concepts in the role of future nurse leaders and managers. Marquis and Huston note that for managers and leaders to function at their greatest potential the two must be integrated (cited by McAdoo 2003). The integration of leadership skills and the ability to perform management functions is necessary if an individual is to become an effective manager in the current health care environment in Ireland.

The Development of the Health Strategy initiatives and the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on Nursing (1998) and the Office of Health Management will enhance the development of future nurse leaders and managers in the nursing profession. By adopting a transformational leadership style, nurse managers and leaders will enhance staff morale, improve recruitment and retention and improve the delivery of quality patient care.

        

However, much of that literature has tended to overstate the effectiveness of such strategies. Critics of this ‘culturalist’ perspective argue that ‘corporate culture’, if it exists at all, does so only at the level of senior management. In reality many sub-cultures exist within an organisation, comprising an ‘organisational’ culture that may resist, and even reject, attempts to impose a ‘corporate’ culture. What is clear from a review of this literature is that culture, either ‘corporate’ or ‘organisational’, is a term whose definition is both vague and ambiguous and usually defined in terms that are sympathetic to the needs of the user.

To paraphrase Humpty Dumpty, ‘culture is whatever I say it is’, and to fully understand attempts at achieving cultural change, the limitations of such definitions must be acknowledged. It has been recognised that the management of change, cultural or otherwise, is contingent on factors that are both internal and external to the organisation, and that the process of change can not be fully understood unless these contingencies are acknowledged, and the extent of their influence identified (Hyman 1987; Thompson & McHugh 1995; Kelly 1998; Mabey et al. 1998; Blyton & Turnbull 1998). These contingencies can be categorised as historical; structural; cultural; and that of ‘human agency’. Evidence from this case study will reinforce the view that organisational change is contingent to the dialectic processes between ‘structure’ (historical, organisational and cultural) and ‘agency’, dialectic processes both within and external to the organisation. It will go on to demonstrate that the success or failure of such change initiatives will be influenced most by ‘agency’ as all individuals within an organisation are active participants in the construction and reconstruction of organisational reality.

The paper draws on data collected over a two-year period of an ongoing research project. Both participative and non-participative research methods were used and access was grated to all personnel within the organisation, in all sections of the organisation, up to and including the Managing Director.

Case Study: Turnhay Engineering.
Background.
Turnhay Engineering is a branch plant of a European based multi-national corporation, located in the north of England. Placed within the ‘light engineering’ sector, producing a specific finished product range for a small, though powerful, customer base. During recent years it has undergone several changes of ownership, and was acquired by the Multi-national Corporation 5 years ago. Subsequent to the acquisition, a new management team was brought in, whose first step was a programme of redundancy which reduced the workforce from 230 down to 180. With three main competitors in what is an extremely competitive market place, great demands in terms of price and quality are imposed and very short ‘lead times’ for some product is the norm. The product sector is also seasonal with demand fluctuating greatly, depending on the time of year. This seasonal product market, exacerbated by the problems of specificity and dependency, are the primary causal factors behind the attempts to change the organisational culture at Turnhay Engineering.

Historically, the response to seasonal fluctuations in the demand for product has been to recruit agency workers (temps) during times of high demand, when all shop-floor personnel (permanent and agency) work high levels of overtime. The new management team recognised that this solution was inappropriate as the excessively high labour costs involved significantly affected profit margins.

The individuals attempting to bring more efficient solutions to this perennial problem were the Operations Manager and the Human Resource Manager. In common with most people seeking any form of radical change, they were aware that they were not starting from a clean sheet, and that overcoming the historical baggage associated with the firm would be a huge obstacle on the road to securing that change. The solution was seen to lie in a change of culture, from an ‘organisational’ culture based on ‘ad-hocracy’, ‘fire-fighting’ and blame, to a ‘corporate’ culture based on commitment, empowerment and continuous improvement. ‘Turnhay 2000′ was the name given to the strategic plan, implemented at the beginning of 1998, with the ambition of securing this change in culture by January 2000.

Developing the message.
The single most important defining factor of the organisational culture of Turnhay Engineering is the seasonal nature of the product market. Demand for product begins to build from the end of August, reaching a peak by the end of December. During this period the factory resembles a mad house. From January until July demand barely keeps the factory ticking over. The influence of this seasonal demand on the firm, both organisationally and financially, cannot be overstated as it is the root cause of all tensions and conflicts within the firm, as well as the source of all ambiguities and inconsistencies apparent in the actions and activities within, and between, all levels of management.

The past history of the firm is one of continual change, not simply in ownership, but also in organisational structures and working practices. This historical baggage had not created a climate conducive to feelings of trust, nor did it foster a willingness to accept yet more change. The redundancy programme initiated following the most recent change in ownership exacerbated this situation, and these internal tensions were magnified by the social, political and economic uncertainties present in the local labour market. The influences that external cultures, gestated in geographical traditions and historical experiences, exert on attempts to introduce change have been documented elsewhere (Roberts1997; Wray1996) and were recognised by senior management at the beginning of the project.

Some of the cultural problems with the workforce I think are geographical. Our workers don’t like change - nor responsibility. ‘Us and them’ is very strong here and it may have to do with the old industries - the mines and the steelworks. The workers in this area have a long experience of redundancy and high levels of unemployment. This doesn’t create a climate conducive to trust. (HR Manager).

Tactically, the strategic objectives of ‘Turnhay 2000’ were to be achieved through the introduction of Total Quality Management (TQM) systems, designed to improve quality through continuous improvement, and new organisational structures which would increase efficiency by working smarter not harder. If successful, these initiatives would bring to end production systems based, to a great extent, on ad-hoc methods and eliminate the need for ‘fire-fighting’ and the apportioning of blame when things went wrong. This strategy appears to be based on the belief that attitudinal changes in the workforce (and presumably a cultural change) can be generated by changes in the patterns and structures of work organisation, a belief that is supported by the ‘culturalist’ literature. (Peters & Waterman 1982; Boje & Winsor 1993; Argyris 1998) The ambition was to create a ‘corporate’ culture based on a multi-skilled, flexible, empowered workforce, fully committed to the firm and inculcated with the philosophy of total quality production methods and the need for continuous improvement.

All initiatives were developed internally, and with no external funding made available by the parent company, the resources necessary for the implementation of the project had to be generated internally. While it would appear that significant resources, both in terms of time and finance have been available, this fact may have impacted on the outcome of the project to date. It should also be understood that the initiatives introduced were not intended to stand alone as each one represented an interlocking part of the overarching and comprehensive project that is ‘Turnhay 2000’.

Transmitting the message.
The customised package of initiatives that can be broadly categorised as TQM systems, included initiatives that can be differentiated between ‘hard’ and ’soft’ (Wilkinson et al. 1998). The ‘hard’ aspects of ‘Turnhay 2000’ involved systems of data collection, including the quantity and quality of production down to individual worker performance levels; and delivery times and cost. A measured system of continuous improvement was also introduced based on procedures for ‘Kaizen’ improvements. To maximise the effect of the surveillance aspect of these ‘hard’ initiatives, notice boards were introduced into every work area.

Basically, the ‘visuals’ are so that everyone is made aware of how they stand in relation to what they do. (Production Manager)

‘Soft’ initiatives involved improving consultation systems with the workforce, including the re-launch of a Works Committee; worker briefings; monthly company briefings; and the introduction of a monthly ‘newsletter’. The firm started to move towards ’single status’ by improving the sick pay scheme available to hourly paid staff towards the levels enjoyed by salaried staff, and by introducing common work-wear for all employees. Social events were organised, including golf and snooker competitions, trips for ‘go-kart’ racing, and a ?1,000 grant was provided towards the creation of a self-financing Social Club. These ’social’ initiatives were a deliberate attempt to foster a high trust climate and to build team spirit within the workforce.
Before ‘Turnhay 2000’ was initiated, two preparative measures were undertaken. Firstly, the organisation of the shop-floor was restructured in an attempt to rationalise a very ad-hoc system of work organisation and terms and conditions that had been created by a continuous series of changes in ownership. (HR Manager)

This rationalisation flattened out a grading structure that had previously included 9 different grades to leave 2 production grades and two supervisory grades. The shop-floor was also differentiated functionally with the creation of five production ‘Cells’ each with a ‘Cell Leader’, accountable for the performance of their ‘Cell’, including production levels; quality standards; and discipline. The Cell Leaders were to be assisted by a ‘Shift Leader’ on each of the two production shifts. A Production Manager was also brought in at this time to oversee all shop-floor production and the position of Continuous Improvement Facilitator was created. The role of this individual was to introduce and oversee the constant improvement requirements identified by the Continuous Improvement Steering Committee made up of the HR Manager, the Operations Manager and the Financial Director.

The Cell Leaders were identified as the main conduit through which change was to be introduced; the messengers bringing the new ‘corporate culture’ to the shop-floor. The first concern for Senior Management was to convert the Cell Leaders to the necessity for a new culture; to get them ‘on message’. If the current overall situation of the firm was not a good starting point for initiating change, some of the individual Cell Leaders were not the preferred messengers. Of the five Cell Leaders, the three at the front end of the productive process (the Cells most susceptible to last minute demands for product) were all promoted internally, immediately prior to the arrival of HR Manager to the firm.

One of the things I was hired to do was to recruit suitable personnel for these pivotal Cell Leader roles, but when I got here I found 3 of them already in place. I wouldn’t have picked these three individuals, and the results of subsequent psychometric testing supported my original views. However, getting kit out the door and on time requires high levels of product knowledge as well as the ability to firefight. That is why they were promoted, and I was stuck with them. (HR Manager)

The remaining two Cell Leaders were brought in from the outside, and a training programme, provided by a firm of Management Consultants, was introduced to prepare them to implement the intended changes. In order to motivate these individuals a ?6,000 salary increase was promised if ‘Turnhay 2000’ was successfully delivered on time. They were also made aware that if it were not, they would be replaced.

The second preparative initiative was directed towards the main organisational problem: the seasonal nature of product demand. It was recognised that solving this problem would provide a less volatile working environment, more conducive to the introduction of change. The solution took the form of a system of ‘banked hours’ where all employees would be re-paid for 100 hours of work over the year. These hours ‘in the bank’ would be drawn upon by management in times of high demand, when a maximum of 8 hours per week could be ‘withdrawn’ from the balance before overtime rates were triggered. Those workers finding themselves laid-off during the slack period had the choice of taking holidays or continuing to receive wages and increase the balance in their ‘account’. The intention was to smooth out the demand for labour across the year, thus reducing the need for temps. The introduction of this initiative would have serious and unforeseen repercussions for ‘Turnhay 2000’, as will be discussed later.

Training was also implemented during the ‘slack’ period at the beginning of 1998 for the entire core workforce, undertaken by the same firm of management consultants involved in the training of the Cell Leaders. This involved introducing all employees to the need for continuous improvement in the productive process, hopefully creating the ambition to ‘work smarter’. The ability of these systems to reduce the need for labour was not lost on some of those taking part, and some identified the process as an attempt to reduce the need for ‘temps’. A few, perhaps the more perceptive of them, recognised the potential of these working systems to increase their workloads.

The problems in gaining significant and, more importantly, lasting change in the workplace, is that it can not be accomplished overnight. Hogarth (1993) identifies the most successful attempts as those where a long-term approach has been used. When failure does occur they are usually explained away by ‘culturalists’ as a failure to implement the initiatives in a comprehensive way, exacerbated by a failure to adopt the HRM initiatives that are complimentary, not to say crucial to the process (Godard 1998: Parker 2000). Godard (1998) tells us that such explanations are an oversimplification of what is an extremely complicated process. He argues that the conflict inherent in the employment relationship limits both the effectiveness and sustainability of initiatives for change. A situation exacerbated by the inner contradictions present in all such attempts (Argyris 1998)

The ‘Turnhay 2000’ project, while specifically designed for the long term was not exempt, either from the tensions involved in the employment relationship, nor from the internal contradictions described by Argyris. Again it has to be stated that the seasonal nature of product demand was a serious causal factor in the tensions between management and worker, and of the contradictions subsequently identified within the project.

The project was launched in January 1998, with all initial training taking place, and all initiatives introduced to the workforce, prior to onset of the busy period. The determination of the management team to succeed, and the difficulties the project would have to surmount can be seen from the following statement.

This initiative will be seen through. There is a determination here now. People are waiting for it to fail, or stop, or go away. However, there is too much invested in it, both in terms of resource and credibility. (HR Manager)

Inherent in this statement is the realisation that the workforce would be watching the development of the project, looking for critical case incidents that would indicate the level of managerial determination. Despite this realisation, evidence shows that immediately the demand for product started to rise the project became only of secondary importance to getting product out of the door, on time, in sufficient quantity, and to the required quality. Evidence of this could be seen throughout the organisation. Following the first two meetings of the Continuous Improvement Steering Committee, it met only intermittently during the busy period. Briefings did not take place, training came to an end, especially the ‘cross-training’ designed to create a more flexible workforce. Continuous improvement initiatives were left to drift, evidence of which could be seen in the tables kept by the CI Facilitator. Fire-fighting became the norm for all concerned in production, including Senior Managers.

The Senior Management team justified this ‘drift’ as a period of consolidation, following which the project would move forward with increased vigour. During the busy period of 1998 the HR Manager reported that the initiatives to date have been to get people interested and involved. We are in a period of consolidation now and the main focus of Turnhay 2000 will take place in the slack period next year.

Following similar problems in the busy period of 1999, the deadline for the completion ‘Turnhay 2000’ was talked of as coming at the end of the year 2000, and that the project would be…
…kick started, because we’ve lost some momentum recently. The workforce need a clear message that this isn’t going to go away - especially the Cell leaders. Turnhay 2000 in now built on sand, and we have to put it on a firmer footing. (HR Manager)

The result of all of this ambiguity and inconsistency was that the message, at best, had been delivered intermittently, with each individual involved in the process left to draw their own conclusions. That intermittence was due, at least in part, to the reception that the message has had from the workforce.

Receiving the message.
To achieve any form of organisational change, not least a cultural change, management must gain the support, or at least the acquiescence of the workforce. (Hogarth 1993) When ‘Turnhay 2000’ was initiated the climate of workforce opinion was such that change would be difficult to realise.

The workers here are suffering from ‘initiative overload’. The firm has a long history of starting things, but not seeing them through, and they see these new initiatives as more of the same. They’re keeping their heads down and waiting for them to go away. (CI Facilitator)

These feelings of suspicion were not allayed by the introduction of the ‘banked hours’ system as it was met with great hostility, and interpreted by the workforce as a system advantageous the to firm, but at their expense. This hostility was increased by the disparity of effect across the shop floor. Depending on demand for particular product, and the skills of the individual worker, some found themselves ‘laid off’ and increasing their ‘banked hours’, while others were working high levels of overtime. Also, workers were often ‘laid off’ from one Cell while ‘temp’s’ were employed in another. This hostility has had serious repercussions for management in terms of moral and commitment to the ‘Turnhay 2000’ project, but perhaps most seriously on the performance levels of some workers. The workforce are well aware of the cyclical nature of product demand, and when they perceived that demand was beginning to slacken off, individual performance often dropped below the levels achieved during busy periods. The workers seeing themselves to be in danger of being ‘laid off’ engaged in ‘quota restriction’ (Roy 1952) in attempts to forestall the inevitable result of a lack of work.

When the slack period comes, everyone just lets go. The pace of work on the shop-floor slacks off and nobody seems to be able to stop it. Certainly not the Cell Leaders or the Shift Leaders, and the reason is the ‘banked hours’ system. When I told the Opps Manager that the production figures when we’re busy are higher than when we’re slack he thought I was lying, but the figures are there on the system and speak for themselves. (Production Manager)

A second unforeseen effect of this initiative has brought an increase in product classified as ‘non-conformant’ (faulty) which has to be returned to the section producing it. During busy periods, individuals tend to rework any faults themselves if they are able, as they are required to do. During slack periods, however, ‘non-conformant’ product is more likely to be sent back for rework, keeping up the levels work ‘in progress’. This is also a tactic engaged in when individual workers are in conflict with their supervisors, especially over performance levels.

A third unforeseen consequence of ‘banked hours’ has been calls from significant numbers of the workforce for trade union representation. The outcome of these calls is to be the focus of another paper and will not be discussed here.

As ‘Turnhay 2000’ progressed, Senior Managers quickly identified what, for them, were unforeseen consequences of the ‘banked hours’ scheme, with the consequence that the system was modified. In 1999 the level of pre-banked hours was reduced to 40, and for 2000 all workers started with no pre-paid hours ‘in the bank’. This has gone a long way to alleviate the hostility to the scheme, as the workers now see it as beneficial as it provides protection from being ‘laid off’ with no prior cost to themselves. However these workers will presumably continue to attempt to ‘make out’ (Burawoy 1979) in order to avoid accruing ‘banked hours’.

The continuous improvement systems were structured around kaizen improvements, and in an initial attempt to indoctrinate the workforce in the concept of continuous improvement, any and all suggestions for kaizen improvements were accepted, at times taking on the form of theatre. For example, a welder requested that a clock be placed in the welding section, claiming that this would save 5 minutes per day, per welder, as they would no longer have to leave their workstations to find out the time for breaks etc. This kaizen went through the ‘feasibility’ process, which compared cost against projected savings. Using a proscribed formula that set the cost of time (at a rate including all manufacturing overheads) it was discovered that a clock in each of the welding sections would make an annual saving of ?9,480 set against a cost of ?20 for the clocks. This should only be seen as an attempt to get workers involved in the idea submitting suggested improvements, and not as any real attempt to evaluate the savings of such suggestions. If this example is to be taken seriously we must assumes that all welders work non-stop, do not collectively possess a watch, and do not communicate with each other. Once the system was established, more realistic cost/benefit analyses were introduced, using a formula that calculated the cost in time only at the hourly rate of the worker concerned.

To maintain the impetus of continuous improvement a requirement of 2 kaizen’s per month was established for each employee, with prizes for the ‘best’ and ‘most completed’ kaizen’s. This dual approach is indicative of way ambiguity can exist in many managerial initiatives. The setting of targets suggests they are simply trying to force compliance, while the reward system suggests they are seeking to encourage commitment. The setting of targets may even prove to be counterproductive as the setting of targets is an attempt to force compliance but will act as a deterrent. If someone thinks of more than their monthly quota they’ll keep it to themselves for the following month.

The responses from the workforce to this quota/reward system also exhibit ambiguity. Some workers fully engaged with process, offering more than the required quota, while others have been less than enthused, seeking to ‘make out’. In doing so some workers have ‘paired up’, jointly developing kaizen suggestions, but submitting them under one name. During that particular month, one partner has a chance of winning a prize, while the other is willing to chance a bollocking for not putting any in. The following month they change roles, with any prize shared.

Others work the system in different ways; for example it was quickly recognised on the shop-floor that if a kaizen required the involvement of the maintenance department it would be put on hold, reducing the need to come up with other kaizen’s. Still others are ‘making out’ by working smarter, but for themselves. They’ve taken on board the idea of thinking about how they can make their jobs easier but don’t make the changes official. This is for two reasons, one they don’t want to make targets higher for themselves and two they would only get grief from their mates if they raised targets generally.

This is an example of the strength of the sub-cultures that exist in all organisations. Within any given culture there will be different codes to which individuals have to adhere. There are the rules and regulations that all individuals within an organisation must obey, and there are the unwritten, though nonetheless binding, codes of the shop floor that no worker can ignore.

Almost all concerned have recognised the danger that continuously improving production could lead to reductions in personnel. Typically:
These ideas are straight out of some book and some of the people sprouting them have no idea of the possible consequences. Constant improvement could get a lot of people finished. (Shop-floor worker)

Boje and Winsor (1993) describe TQM as a form of self-Taylorisation; a situation recognised by at least one of the workforce.

Management are just picking our brains because they don’t know how to do the job themselves. It’s always more, more, more, faster, faster, faster. I mean, think about it, what the f**k has culture got to do with welding. (Welder)

If the seasonal nature of product demand is the driving force behind these initiatives, it has also been influential on the way the message has been received. Worker reactions and attitudes have fluctuated, as have those of senior managers, all synchronous with product demand. During periods of high demand, the initiatives become secondary to production, a fact not lost on the workforce. Blyton & Turnbull (1992) suggest that postponement of new managerial initiatives during busy periods may be indicative of a temporary susceptibility to worker resistance. At Turnhay Engineering, these postponements are not due to any real susceptibility to workers resistance, but to the susceptibility of senior managers to the prevailing organisational culture. During the busy period fire-fighting and the need to get ‘kit’ out becomes all important, not least to the senior managers responsible for the shop-floor, and as a result the ‘Turnhay 2000’ project tends to lapse, a fact recognised by the HR Manager.

Our main problem remains the seasonal nature of the product. Between January and July we can do things, but the rest of the time it’s a mad house. Everything but productions comes to a halt. We seem to take two steps forward and one step back.

It is also a situation recognised by the workforce.
They started things off, then things got busy so they stopped. They pick up pace again when things get slack. People here have seen a lot of promises made before, and have seen them come to nothing. There is a feeling on the shop-floor of ‘here we go again’. (Shift Leader)

Even those workers who appear to be sympathetic to the new initiatives have recognised the paradox apparent in management actions.

I can see the sense in the new system - if they’re allowed to work – but they all seem to go out the window when the pressure is on. (shop-floor worker)

These statements would suggest that human agency has little influence over this process, the main problem being structural. However, other views are held.

The most difficult thing facing management is to change attitudes, not procedures. A lot of people are simply going through the motions. Some are dead against the new initiatives – these people can be dealt with. The main problem is dealing with the people who’re only paying lip service to them. These people are difficult to identify but who can derail everything.

At least one individual places the blame for lack of progress firmly on senior management.
The senior managers are to blame for the stop/start situation. They don’t have the bottle to force things through. One of the major blockages is ‘maintenance’, but they won’t take them on. Some of the other Cell Leaders are only paying lip service to the whole thing, they’re not really committed, and Senior Management know it. (Cell Leader)

Whatever the truth of these allegations, the power to apportion blame for the lack of progress lies with Senior Management, a power they were not unwilling to use.

Shooting the messengers.
The first casualty of the project was the Production Manager, brought in due to her extensive experience of the auto-motive industry, was the victim of a self-inflicted wound, leaving the organisation by choice because of the failure to implement change. Fire-fighting is the excuse they all hide behind, but the truth is they don’t try. When I came here, I tried to show them (the Cell Leaders) how improvements could be made, gave them examples, but nothing happened so I stopped trying. Despite what they say I don’t think they’re totally committed to change, they don’t seem to be able to set disciplines and consequently the shop-floor runs in a disorganised manner… basically the Cell Leaders are not up to the job.

This frustration was generated by an inability to cope with uncertainty and a lack of product knowledge. The comfort zone for this individual was within the orderliness of procedural disciplines.

The perceived lack of ability of the Cell Leaders, identified by the HR Manager on his arrival at the firm, was exacerbated by an apparent loyalty to, and identification with, the shop-floor. Senior Management felt that this downward identification was making it difficult to persuade these individuals to take ownership of ‘Turnhay 2000’, as the project could have serious consequences for the people for whom they were responsible, and with whom they identified. Delbridge & Lowe (1997) identify the contradictory relationships supervisors have with the workers they are responsible for, and the Senior Managers to whom they are themselves responsible. They conclude that the role of the supervisor is often to act as a ‘buffer’ to offset the worst aspects of uncertainty in the labour process. In the case of Turnhay Engineering, this uncertainty is caused by the seasonal nature of the product demand and the stop/start nature of ‘Turnhay 2000’. The ambiguity of this position is exacerbated by a marked lack of belief in the project by the majority of Cell Leaders. Typical of these views:

I don’t know what all the fuss is about. The sooner they (Senior Management) realise that we’re not making airplanes here the better. We’re a ‘jobbing shop’ and a bloody good one as well. We should be building on that strength, not wasting time on trying to become something we’re not.

One of the prime objectives of Senior Management, at the beginning of ‘Turnhay2000’, was to get the Cell Leaders working as a team to instill the structures and ethos of the project within themselves and the workforce. Teamwork is evident between the Cell Leaders in the area of production, as very difficult situations are ‘managed’ on an informal and ‘ad hoc’ basis in order to meet tight production deadlines, but little evidence is apparent of a collective commitment to the ‘Turnhay 2000’. It should be recognised that these individuals are an occupational group in their own right, and consequently no less impelled to ‘make out’ at work than any other worker. Being ‘on the same side’ as the workers they are responsible for may be contradictory to the role expected of them by their managers, but given the uncertain nature of the labour process at Turnhay Engineering, that alignment may be the only way they can achieve their own production targets. Personal loyalty downwards being rewarded by extra effort from their workers, when required. Delbridge & Lowe (1997) provide evidence of this phenomenon, and this case study would appear to support their findings.

Notwithstanding the above point, Senior Management feel that the prevailing organisational culture is the main reason why the Cell Leaders were unable to move ‘Turnhay 2000’ forward in any appreciable and consistent way. The HR Manager believed that the new initiatives represented a challenge to the comfortable position of the Cell Leaders, requiring them to leave the comfort zone to assume new roles and responsibilities. A challenge they were unwilling to accept either collectively, or individually. This represents a limited view of the actions of the Cell Leaders. Their ability to fire-fight successfully generated considerable pride and a sense of achievement within the group, and attempts to change their operational methods represented a threat to their organisational identities. The Cell Leaders are what they do, their ‘place’ and status within the organisation comes from their product knowledge and the ability to fire-fight. The greater the demand for product, the greater the autonomy they have, as in essence they are empowered by uncertainty.

Despite the interpretations made by Senior Managers of the attitudes and responses of the Cell Leaders to ‘Turnhay 2000’ they were never challenged in any significant way. The imperatives of production within extremely tight deadlines acted as a shield behind which the Cell Leaders could shelter from the increasing demands made upon them to change. However, once the busy period of 1999 was over the circumstances providing this protective shield were removed, and their reluctance to engage meaningfully with ‘Turnhay 2000’ had serious consequences for the group. The relationship between the Senior Managers and the Cell Leaders had deteriorated to the point that the implementation of ‘Turnhay 2000’ had become a contest. Following the failure to give pre-arranged presentations on the position of the project within their individual cells, due to the demands of the shop-floor, the HR Manager stated that they have won again. If the avoidance of the presentations was a victory for the Cell Leaders, it was of a phyrric nature.
Late in December 1999 (toward the end of the busy period) the firm announced a program of redundancies, in which the workforce would be reduced by 30. In the process, three of the Cell Leaders were made redundant and the remaining two were moved ‘sideways’ into ‘planing’ roles. These two were retained, primarily because of product knowledge and technical skills.
Over the last year it had become apparent that the Cell Leaders weren’t up to the job, they were in fact obstacles to change and had to go.

Production within the cells became the responsibility of the Shift Leaders, who would…
…have to become different animals. They’ve hidden behind the Cell Leaders, and now they’ll be exposed as managers, they’ll have to get off the fence and they’ll have to deliver.

The example of the Cell Leaders was not lost on the Shift Leaders.
We know where we stand now. If we don’t deliver we’ll be out as well. I see it as an opportunity for myself, but it’s a threat as well.

Management viewed this redundancy program as a vehicle to kick-start the change process.
We’ve come a long way in the last couple of years, we’ve made advances in all the areas we wanted to, and recently we’ve been through a period of consolidation. Now is the time to move on, and the people who’re left are not stupid, they know we’ve got rid of the bad eggs. It’ll be a relief to everyone when we start to move forward again, the pressures on people will increase, but they’ll increase for everyone, us included. Everyone must be focused in on what they do, must be more receptive to change.

Conclusion.
The ‘culturalists’ would argue that the limited success of the ‘Turnhay 2000’ project to date, results from the failure to implement the initiatives properly, backed up by appropriate HR policies. (Goddard 1990). More critical industrial/employee relations analyses would suggest that worker resistance has limited the success of the project. While there may be merit in these arguments, especially the second, they are an oversimplification of an extremely complex reality, a reality that is full of ambiguity and contradiction, with actions often eliciting unforeseen consequences. Parker (2000) captures this organisational complexity by describing organisations as fragmented unities, as individuals within an organisation identify themselves as collective in some circumstances and at some times, and divided in other circumstances and at other times.

The evidence could be interpreted as a Senior Management team using the rhetoric of cultural change; of empowerment; of commitment; to gain the behavioral compliance of the workforce to a new set of bureaucratic requirements; requirements designed simply to increase productivity through the intensification of work. By using the language of TQM and ‘culture’ in ways that Webb (1996) describes as a new vocabulary of motive to legitimate organisational change, they are seeking to achieve greater control over the workforce, rather than a commitment to organisational goals. This is the view held by one of the management consultants used by Turnhay.

Culture is a term that is used as a smokescreen for increased control over the shop floor. You have an objective and you set targets to be achieved through effective measures. If people’s attitudes are changed in the process then this is an advantageous byproduct of the process. Welcome, but not necessary. It’s very difficult to change attitudes, it’s much easier to change behavior.

The above statement may reflect a recognition that a cultural change is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, and that behavioral compliance is an achievable, and therefore acceptable alternative. The evidence from this case study would suggest that even a behavioral change is contingent to the discourses between structure and agency. Evidence would suggest that for the individuals behind the project, ‘Turnhay 2000’ represents a genuine attempt to create a better climate within the firm; a genuine attempt to improve relations between management and worker. The resources, both financial and personal, invested in the initiatives by these individuals, designed to get people playing together as well as working together, is evidence of this.

There have been two main obstacles to these attempts, neither of which are mutually exclusive. Firstly, the attempts have been permeated with ambiguity and contradiction, and secondly, a more critical analysis would highlight the extent to which the attempts to accomplish a ‘cultural change’ have been frustrated by pr-existing patterns of organisational culture. One of the contradictions was identified by the HR Manager when he recognised that the Cell Leaders were stuck in the middle - very good at the wrong things as far as ‘Turnhay 2000’ is concerned.

The Cell Leaders were measured by what they did: on getting product out, and by implementing the requirements of ‘Turnhay 2000’. The pressures from above to implement the required changes were offset by pressure from the same people to continually meet very tight production targets. These individuals were caught firmly in the middle of a process they had little control over. With Senior Managers calling simultaneously for product and for change, the Cell Leaders believed they could deliver only one or the other, and not both. When they responded to the most immediate of these demands (for product) they were accused of refusing to come out of their comfort zone. As a result of their individual and collective abilities, they were able to function and, to a point, resist the demands of Senior Management.

The reality of this ambiguous and contradictory situation is that the Senior Managers are part of the same organisational culture as the Cell Leaders, and their actions are conditioned by that pre-existing culture, and in the same way. That the periods of consolidation talked of by Senior Mangers coincided with periods of high product demand, was not lost on the Cell Leaders, and suggests that Senior Managers have a comfort zone of their own which they are also reluctant to leave. If the need to firefight is the shield behind which the Cell Leaders sheltered to avoid engaging fully in ‘Turnhay 2000’, Senior Managers appear to have been sheltering behind the same shield. The intensity of the calls from Senior Management to implement change fluctuated inversely to the demands for product, resulting in ambiguous messages being received, leading to conflicting responses from the Cell Leaders.

The ambiguous messages transmitted by the Senior Management team have had a similar impact on the shop floor. The stop-start nature of the project has reinforced the cynicism generally felt within the workforce towards ’Turnhay 2000’. At this stage in the project, many of the shop floor workforce continue to believe it will eventually go away, and if these circumstances continue the very best that Senior Management will achieve will the behavioral compliance of the workforce to a new set of bureaucratic requirements.

        

Lehman’s first ‘law’ draws attention to a basic property of software systems, which is they evolve or die. One reason there is software change is new requirements, improvements are thought up and old ones become obsolete, evolving technology may cause this. Lehman’s second ‘law’ points to a fundamentally important precept that, when there is software change work has to be done to preserve quality of structure, let alone improve it if need be.

Configuration management
Configuration management is the development and application of standards and procedures for managing an evolving systems product. As discussed above there is many reasons for management of systems, another reason is many different versions within one system. Different versions involve proposals for change, corrections of faults and adaptations for alternate hardware or operating systems. Configuration management keeps a track of all changes made and how these changes have been implemented into the software. Configuration management procedures define how to record and process proposed system changes, relating to system components and methods used to identify versions of system. Configuration management tools are used to store versions of system components, build systems from components supplied and track the releases of version to the customer. Configuration management is sometimes seen as a general software quality management process this could be because manager share quality management and configuration management responsibilities. I have produced a simple diagram to clearly show the root from developer to configuration management;

Configuration managers are responsible for keeping track of differences between versions, ensuring new versions are derived in a controlled way and releasing new versions to correct customers at correct time. I can here you saying why have different configurations? The answer is many reasons for different configuration;
· Different computers (dell,hp)
· Different operating systems (linux,windows)
· Different client-specific functions

This diagram shows an example piece of software with different configuration and how one configuration can have others based on it.

Configuration management standards
Configuration management process and associated documents should be based on standards such as IEEE 828-1983, which defines standards for configuration management plans. The standard should be published in the configuration management handbook or part of the quality handbook. Many standards can be used because all include important comparable processes. Taking some models as examples, ISO 9000 and SEI’s capability maturity model, organisations must define and follow formal configuration management standards for quality certification. Waterfall model the software is delivered to configuration management team after development complete and individual components tested. The team then takes control of builds and testing of complete system. If any faults are discovered during testing, the specific component is passed back to developer for repair then passed back to configuration management when fault is fixed. This approach influenced the development of configuration management standards and these have an embedded assumption that a waterfall model of the software process will be used for system development. Some organisations have therefore developed to configuration management that supports concurrent development and system testing. This relies on very regular (daily) build if the whole system from its components:-
· Time will be set for component delivery. All new versions must be delivered even if incomplete but should provide some functionality.
· New version is built, linking all components to make complete system.
· It’s then sent for testing, developers still work on components on previous faults and functionality.
· Faults found are documented and returned. These are repaired for next version.

Advantages of using daily builds include, problems can be found that stem from component interaction early in the software creation, it encourages thorough unit testing of components. Developer are put under pressure not to ‘break the build’ which causes whole system to fail. Breaking the build refers to the developer delivering a component with errors that wont allow the whole to compile therefore the build will fail, meaning time wasted. Another pro would be less system time is spent discovering and coping with faults that should be found within unit testing. Daily builds need very stringent change management process to keep track of problems that have been discovered and repaired. It also leads to a large number of system and component versions. Good configuration management is therefore essential for this approach to work successfully.

Configuration management planning
Configuration management planning is a plan describing the standards and procedures used for the configuration management. The start point for the plan is a general set of company-wide configuration management standards and are adapted as necessary for each specific project. Configuration management plans should be organised into chapters and include:-
· Definition of entities to manage and formal scheme of identifying entities
· Person responsible for configuration management procedures and submitting controlled entities to configuration management team
· Configuration management policies for change and version management
· Tools to be used and processes to be applied when using the tools
· Definition of configuration management database which is used to record configuration information

The most important part of the plan is the definition of responsibilities- who is responsible for delivery of each document or software component to quality team and configuration management. The person responsible for document delivery is not always same person who produced it. This makes it convenient to make project manager/team leader responsible for all documents produced by the team.

Configuration management documents
Large pieces of software will have thousands of documents many being technical documents which present snap shots of ideas for further development; theses are documents subject to frequent and regular change. Other documents include memos, meeting minutes, plans and proposals etc. During the configuration management planning process, you decide exactly which items are to be controlled documents or groups of related documents are to be put under configuration control, these are know as formal documents or configuration items. Projects plans, specifications, design, programs and pre-defined test data suites are maintained as configuration items, documents necessary for future maintenance should be controlled. The document-naming scheme assigns a unique name to all documents under configuration control. If there are relationships between these documents e.g. design documents will be associated with programs, the relations can be recorded by organising the naming scheme so that related documents have common roots to their name, leading to a hierarchical naming scheme. I have produced an example of a document configuration hierarchy.

The initial part of the hierarchy would be the project name, in the project there are four separate tools with the tool name used as next part of the name. Each tool is made up of different named modules which shows two formal documents are required for each managed entity, these are code of the components and set of tests for code. Upon reading about the document-naming scheme I can see one flaw, its project based meaning not reusable for other projects.

Configuration management database
The configuration management database is used to record all relevant information relating to configurations. Database functions are to assist with assessing the impact of the system change and provide management information about configuration management process. Also defining the configuration database schema with procedures for recording and retrieving project information also defined as part of configuration management planning process. The database will provide the answers to the following queries:-
· Which customer have which version
· What hardware and o/s is required for version
· How many versions are there and when was they created
· What version relies on particular components
· Outstanding changes required on version
· How many report faults exist on version

Tools
Configuration data should be integrated with version management system. Case tools makes it possible to link changes directly with documents and components affected by change. Links between documents such as design documents and code may be maintained so that it’s relatively easy to find everything that must be modified when a change is proposed. Many companies don’t use integrated case tools for configuration management but maintain their configuration database as a separate system. The configuration items may be stored in files or in a version management system such as RCS, a well-known version management system for unix. This configuration database stores information about configuration items and references file names in the version management system. Its cheep and flexible but the disadvantages are configuration items may be changed without going through the configuration database and cant be sure configuration database is up-to-date.

Change management
Change is a fact of life for large systems. A defined change management process and associated case tool ensure changes are recorded and applied in a cost-effective way. Change management process comes into effect when associated document put under the control of the configuration management team. May be initiated during system testing or after customer delivery. The first stage of change management is CRF change request form where requests sets out change required to the system. Here is an example of a change management process:-
complete(CRF) analyse change request if valid assess how to do change record in database submit to control board if accepted repeat make change
record submit to quality management
until quality adequate
create new version

As well as recording changes, CRF records recommendations regarding the change, estimate cost and dates when change was requested, approved, implemented and validated. CRF should be registered in the configuration database so configuration management team can track status.

Version management and identification
Version and release management are the processes of identifying and keeping track of different versions of the system. Version managers devise procedures to ensure versions may be retrieved when required and are not accidentally changed. They work with customer liaison staff to plan when new releases of system should be distributed. New versions should allows be created by configuration management, this makes it easier to maintain consistency in the configuration database as only the configuration management team can change version information. A system version is an instance of a system that differs from other instances. New versions may have different functionality, performance or may repair system faults. Some versions may have the same functions but are designed for different hardware of software configuration. If there is only a small difference one is called a variant of the other. A system release is a version with the intention to be distributed to the customer, each system release should either include new functionality or be intended for different hardware platform. There will be many more versions than releases because versions are created within an organisation for internal development or testing but not released to customer. Version management is always supported by case tools, which manage the store of each version and control access to components. Large pieces of software have hundreds of software components each way exist in many different versions. Version management should define unambiguous way of identifying each component version, specific versions of components may be recovered for further change. There are three basic techniques which may be used for component identification:-
· Version numbering – given unique version number
· Attribute-based identification- given name (not unique across versions) and set of attributes that differ in each version.
· Change-oriented identification

Version numbering
In version numbering the system name is joined to version number to create version id- excel 2.6. Excel is the system name and 2.6 is the unique version number. A first version could be v1.0 so the next would be v1.1, v1.2, unless it’s a release therefore it would be v2.0.Next versions on from this can be v2.1, v2.2. It’s a linear one based on the assumption that versions are created in sequence. Here is a diagram to try and make it clear.

The diagram arrows indicate from which version the new one was produced v1.2 was produced from v1.1. New versions can be produced from older version not just previous version as can be seen when v2.2 is created from v1.2. This can happen because problems in v2.0 and v2.1 have required them to revert back to their last working version. Version numbering is simple but needs good deal of associated information management to keep track of differences. Makes it hard to see which versions have which components.

Attribute based identification
Problems with explicit version naming schemes are that they don’t reflect the many different attributes that may be used to identify versions. Examples of these identifying attributes are:-
· Customers
· Development language
· Development status
· Hardware platform
· Creation date
If each version is identified by unique set of attributes, it’s easy to add new versions that are derived from any of the existing versions. Identified by attribute value, they share most values with their parent version so relationships are maintained. Versions can be retrieved by specifying attribute values, with queries such as the most recently created, range of date etc. Example:-
NJA03(lang=java, plat=nt4, date=june1982)
Attribute-based identification may be implanted directly by version management system. More commonly, however its implemented on top of a hidden version naming scheme and the configuration database maintains links between identifying attributes and underlying system and component versions.

Change oriented identifying
Attribute based of system versions remove some of the problems of version retrieval that are found with simple numbering schemes. Problem is operator needs to know attributes to retrieve and need to use change management system to get relation between version and changes. Change oriented identification is used for systems rather than components so that versions of individual components are hidden from users of the configuration management system. Change sets may be applied in sequence so that in principle at least a version of the system that incorporates any arbitrary set of changes may be created. Therefore, no explicit version identification is required. The configuration management interacts with the version management system indirectly through the change management system.